In the Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath draw a, b and c cards, respectively, from a publicly known deck. Alice and Bob must then communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning who holds a single card. Solutions in the literature provide weak security, where Cath does not know with certainty who holds each card that is not hers, or perfect security, where Cath learns no probabilistic information about who holds any given card from Alice and Bob's exchange. We propose an intermediate notion, which we call ε-strong security, where the probabilities perceived by Cath may only change by a factor of ε. We then show that a mild variant of the so-called geometric strategy gives ε-strong safety for arbitrarily small ε and appropriately chosen values of a, b, c.
Introduction
Consider the following problem, which appeared in the 2000 Moscow Mathematics Olympiad:
Alice, Bob and Cath draw three, three and one cards, respectively, from a publicly known deck of seven. Alice and Bob wish to inform each other of the cards they hold, but they may only do so by public, unencrypted announcements. Moreover, they do not wish for Cath to know who holds a single card that is not hers. Can Alice and Bob achieve this?
It later came to be known as the Russian cards problem [13] , and is interesting from a cryptographical viewpoint since it provides a framework for unconditionally secure communication, perhaps the strongest notion of security that one may demand from a cryptographic protocol.
Notions of cryptographic security
Claude Shannon, one of the first people to formalize the study of cryptography, proposed several notions of cryptographic security. To be precise, he defined the following:
• Computational Security: We say that a protocol is computationally secure for N if at least N operations are needed to break it. It is usually very difficult to prove that protocol is secure in this sense, as we would need to know all the possible strategies for breaking it. However, it is a good measure of when a system isn't secure, that is, when it fails to be secure for a relatively small N .
• Provable Security: We say that a protocol is provably secure if we can link it with a 'hard' problem, cryptographic or not, in such a way that solving the second problem will allow us to break the encryption. In that case, we know that we need at least as many operations to break the code as we need to solve the second problem. Typically, the 'hard' problem is in np but believed to not be in p. Many of the cryptographic protocols in use today are based on this notion of security.
• Unconditional Security: A protocol is unconditionally secure if it can't be broken even with unlimited computational resources; the eavesdropper simply does not have enough information to reconstruct the original message.
It should be clear that unconditional security implies both computational and provable security, and as such it would ideally be desirable to develop unconditionally secure cryptographic protocols. However, such protocols tend to be unpractical and as such few of them are known, with a notable example being Vernam's one time pad [10] . However, the setup of the Russian cards, which presupposes a secure dealing phase, provides a convenient setup for developing unconditionally secure protocols.
Related work
The Russian cards problem may be traced back to Kirkman [8] , but recently it has received renewed attention after its inclusion in the 2000 Mathematics Olympiad [13] . One of the solutions for deals of distribution type (3, 3, 1) uses the Fano plane, a special case of a combinatorial design, which can also be used for many other distribution types [1] . Another solution uses modular arithmetic, which can also be generalized for many distribution types where the eavesdropper holds one card [2] . These solutions use only two announcements, but some cases are known to require more. A solution using three announcements for (4, 4, 2) is reported in [14] , and a four-step protocol for c = O(a 2 ) and b = O(c 2 ) is presented in [4] . The solution we will work with in this paper is similar to the one reported in [3] , which also takes two steps. The Russian cards problem has also been generalized to a larger number of agents in [6, 7] .
However, while the protocols mentioned above provide unconditionally secure solutions to the Russian cards problem in that the eavesdropper may not know with certainty who holds a given card, that does not mean that she may not have a high probability of guessing this information correctly. To this end, stronger notions of security are studied in [12] . There, a distinction is made between weak and perfect security; in perfectly secure solutions, Cath does not acquire any probabilistic information about the ownership of any specific card. All of the above solutions provide weak security in this sense, but Swanson and Stinson show how designs may be used to achieve perfect security, an idea further developed in [11] .
The solutions we present here will provide an intermediate level of security between weak and perfect, controlling the amount of probabilistic information that may be acquired by the eavesdropper, while having the advantage of being much easier to construct than perfectly secure solutions.
A Worked Example
We will motivate the work in this article with a relatively small example. Let's suppose we have 49 cards, with Alice holding 7, Cath holding 5 and Bob the rest. In this case, Alice can take advantage of the fact that there is a field F 7 with 7 elements (the quotient Z/(7) forms a field), and thus may identify each point in the two-dimensional vector space over F 7 , which we will denote 2 7 , with a card. Moreover, she can do this in such a way that her cards (marked by ♠) form a line. Suppose then that Cath holds the cards marked by ♣, while Bob holds the rest of the cards (♦).
Alice then announces how she has distributed the cards on the plane. In this particular announcement, Cath's cards all fall within the same line. This is an extreme case, but it is a real possibility, as Alice has no knowledge of Cath's hand. Bob and Cath know that Alice's hand falls on a line, but they do not know which line. Bob then know exactly which cards Alice holds (since there is only one complete line that he does not hold), but Cath does not. However, she may consider it more likely that Alice holds one card over another. To illustrate this, let us consider the points labeled x and y in Figure 2 .
First we will take a look at x. Cath knows that, in order for Alice to hold x, one of the lines that passes through x must be Alice's hand. We draw these lines on the plane.
Cath knows that not all the lines that pass through x can be Alice's hand, because if a line contains a card that belongs to Cath, it clearly can't all be Figure 1 : Alice assigns each card to a point on the plane in such a way that her hand forms a line. She does not know how the other cards will fall, since she can only see her own hand.
• held by Alice. In this case, only one line fits that description, so Cath takes it out of consideration. We denote this by drawing the line dotted. Every point in the plane has 8 lines that cross it; therefore, the point x still belongs to 7 hands that could possibly belong to Alice.
However, this is not the case for all cards that Cath does not hold. Let us now turn our attention to y. While x was colinear with Cath's hand, all the lines that contain y and one of Cath's cards are different. In this case Cath can discard more lines than whe could when considering x. Only 3 possible lines remain, compared to the 7 lines that pass through x and avoid Cath's hand. Therefore, it appears to Cath that the point x would be more likely to belong to Alice's hand than the point y as there are more possible hands that contain it. Before the announcement, both cards had the same probability to be in Alice's hand but after the announcement, x seems far more likely.
Note that the total number on lines in the announcement is 56. We also know that 36 of these lines contain a card that Cath holds. This is because there are 8 lines touching each point, but the 5 points all share one line. Therefore Alice's hand is one of the 20 lines that avoid Cath's hand. Of those 20 only three contain y compared to the 7 that contain x. Thus, it seems to Cath that there is a 7 /20 = 0.35 probability that Alice holds x compared to 3 /20 = 0.15 that she holds y. Thus, according to the information that Cath has, it is more than twice as likely that Alice holds x as it is that she holds y.
In this case, we know neither of the cards actually belongs to Alice, but we want to be able to quantify this information and control it, especially in higher dimensions where it is not as simple to visualize. Our goal is to show that, by choosing different parameters appropriately, we can make the different probabilities be arbitrarily close to each other. But first we need some preliminaries to make this precise.
Strategies and Probabilistic Security
In this section we will set up the basic concepts needed to formalize the Russian cards problem and different notions of security that one may require from its possible solutions. We will assume that Alice holds a cards, Bob b and Cath c, and Ω is the set of cards with |Ω| = a + b + c. A deal (of size (a, b, c)) is a partition (A, B, C) of Ω such that |A| = a, |B| = b and |C| = c; each of A, B, C represent the hand of Alice, Bob and Cath, respectively.
Equitative strategies
In most solutions to the Russian cards problem, Alice makes an announcement, after which Bob knows the entire deal and thus can make a second (trivial) announcement where he tells Alice which cards Cath holds. Thus we need only model Alice's first announcement, and we follow [12] in referring to the way that Alice is to choose her announcement as a strategy.
Suppose that Alice holds a cards, Bob holds b and Cath holds c. Given a set X and a natural number n, we denote by X n the set of n-element subsets of X, and we will refer to such sets as n-sets. We denote the cardinality of X by |X|. If we let Ω denote the set of cards, a possible hand for Alice is then an element of Ω a . In Alice's first announcement she gives a set of possible hands that she may hold, and thus we may consider an announcement simply as a set A ⊂ Ω a . However, there are many possible announcements that may inform Bob of Alice's hand, and it may be convenient for Alice to randomize from all such possible announcements. Thus a strategy for Alice consists on a probability distribution among the possible announcements that she may choose from.
) is a function S that assigns to each hand A ∈ Ω a a probability distribution over 2 ( Ω a ) . We denote the probability of an announcement A given the hand A as P S (A|A).
Given a strategy S and a hand A, we will say that A is a possible announcement if P S (A|A) > 0. The set of possible announcements will be denoted by S A .
When it is clear from context, we will drop the subindex S and write simply P (A|A) to simplify notation. It will also be convenient for computations if the number of possible announcements is independent of Alice's hand. If we could guarantee that there are γ possible announcements for each hand, we could assign a probability of 1 /γ to each individual announcement. If a strategy has this property, we will say it is γ-equitable [12] .
Definition 2.
A strategy S is equitable if there exists a positive integer γ such that, for every a-set A, |S A | = γ and the probability of choosing a particular announcement A ∈ S A is P (A|A) = 1/γ.
One advantage of equitable strategies is that we need less information to specify them than more general strategies. In particular, we may model equitable strategies merely as a function
where S A is the set of announcements with positive probability (and thus with probability 1 /γ). Since the geometric strategy, which will be our main focus, is equitative, we will adopt this presentation.
The first condition that a two-step solution to the Russian cards problem should satisfy is that Bob should be informed of Alice's hand after an announcement. Let us make this precise. First, we introduce an abuse of notation that we will use throughout the text.
If X ⊂ 2 Ω and Y ⊂ Ω, define
Thus, X \ Y is the set of elements of X avoiding Y . Thus after an informative announcement, Bob knows exactly which hand A Alice is holding. But an informative strategy may also give Cath information, yet we also require for Alice's strategy to be secure.
Probabilistic Security
Before Alice makes an announcement, Cath knows that Alice can possibly hold any hand that doesn't contain one of Cath's cards. Hence, there are a+b a possible hands for Alice. However, after an announcement, Cath can discard any hand that isn't found in the announcement. After doing so, it is possible that Cath acquires new information about the cards she does not hold. In particular, she may know that there is a high probability that Alice holds a given card. If Alice and Bob want to communicate securely, it would be desirable to avoid giving Cath such information.
There are three different notions of probabilistic security for strategies: weak, perfect, and our notion of ε-strong security, which lies between the other two. Unconditional security is equivalent to weak security. If we wanted to avoid Cath learning any probabilistic information after an announcement, we would need to ensure that no card seems more likely after the announcement than it did before. For this, the number of hands in the announcement (after Cath eliminates the ones which have a card that she holds) that contain a given card must be equal for every card that Cath does not hold. In this case, the probability of Alice having a set card should stay the same after Alice's announcement. As a matter of fact, we know the value of this probability; we must only count the hands that could contain that card given Cath's hand and divide it by the number of remaining hands in the announcement:
If this number stays constant after Alice's announcement, we will say that Alice's strategy is perfectly secure.
Definition 4. A strategy S on
Ω a is perfectly secure for (a, b, c) if for every C ∈ Ω c , every card x ∈ Ω \ C, and every announcement A with P (A|C) = 0, we have that
This notion is equivalent to 1-perfect security in [12] and represents Cath's inability to gleam information about the position of individual cards. Compare this to weak security, where we only require that Cath is not certain about the position of any card she does not hold.
, every card x ∈ Ω \ C, and every announcement A with P (A|C) = 0, we have that
In [11, 12] , the authors present examples of perfectly secure strategies when Cath has at most 3 cards. Due to the rigidity needed to ensure this level of security, it is not clear whether perfectly secure strategies can be constructed when Cath holds more cards. Instead, we will define an intermediate level of security, where the constraint is relaxed so we can have more flexibilty and can work in cases where Cath's hand is larger. In fact, this notion will permit us to find secure protocols for any possible hand size that Cath may hold.
As mentioned above, equitable strategies are useful for simplifying computations. In particular, the above probabilities may be computed by counting. The following result can be found in [12] . In other words, the probability that A is Alice's hand given Cath's hand C and the announcement A (when A is a valid hand given C) is given by the quotient of one over the number of hands in the announcement that avoid C.
Thus the probability of Alice having a set hand A according to Cath is 1 /|A\C|. However, what we want to calculate is the probability that Alice holds a given card x. For this, we introduce a new abuse of notation: for X ⊆ 2 Ω and y ∈ Ω, set X y = {X ∈ X : y ∈ X}.
Thus for Z ⊂ Ω, X y \ Z denotes the set of elements of X which contain y but avoid Z. The following can also be found in [12] .
Lemma 2. Let S be an equitable strategy on Ω a and (A, B, C) be a deal. If z ∈ Ω \ C and A ∈ S A , then
Finite geometries
The geometric strategy is convenient because it allows us to use many familiar results from linear algebra. One key difference when working over finite fields (instead of, say, R) is that now it becomes relevant to count the number of points in a subspace, the number of subspaces touching a point, etc. These quantities will be useful more than once in this article. First, we recall a general result about the cardinalities of finite fields. Results in this section are presented without proof; for a more thorough treatment of finite fields and finite geometry, the reader may consult a text such as [5, 9] . Our protocol will be based on affine subspaces of a finite vector space. For brevity, we will refer to an affine space of dimension α as an 'α-plane', while an α-plane passing through the origin (i.e., a linear subspace of dimension α) will be referred to as an 'α-space'.
Definition 7. Let V be a vector space over a field F. We say that W ⊂ V is an α-space if it is a an α-dimensional subspace of V.
A subset U ⊆ V is an α-plane if it is of the form x + W , where x ∈ V and W is an α-space. Two α-planes X, Y are parallel if there exists y ∈ V such that Y = y + X.
Thus an α-plane is similar to an α-space, although it does not necessarily pass through the origin. If F is finite, then it is not difficult to count the number of points on an α-plane. Meanwhile, the intersection of two distinct α-planes is either empty or a γ-plane for some γ < α, which has the following consequence. We may also fix a point x in our vector space and instead ask how many α-planes meet x. Here the dimension of V will be relevant. We will denote the δ-dimensional vector space over F q by F δ q .
Definition 8. Fix a prime power q. Then, given positive integers α ≤ δ, define
Lemma 5. Let q be a prime power and δ ≥ α > 0. Then,
2. Given distinct points x, y ∈ F δ q , the number of α-planes meeting both x and y is given by
The total number of
Proof. For the first claim, we may assume without loss that x = 0. Fix q and let k δ α denote the number of (ordered) sequences v 1 , . .
and hence the total number of α-spaces is
The second claim is proven in a similar fashion. As before, we may assume that x = 0 and fix y = 0. Then we proceed as above, except that we fix v 1 to be y. Then we must remove the first factor from both the numerator and the denominator, obtaining
Finally, for the third claim, note that if we fix an α-space W , the α-planes parallel to W , together with W , form a partition of F 
The Geometric Strategy
We've informally presented the geometric solution to the Russian Cards problem, we will now formalize it to construct the Geometric Strategy. The protocol we will use is essentially presented in [3] . The basic idea is to construct a finite vector space where every point represents a different card and Alice's hand forms an α-plane. Below, we use f [X] to denote the set {f (x) : x ∈ X}.
Definition 9 (The geometric strategy). Let q be a prime power and 0 < α < δ. Given a, b and c such that a = q α and a + b + c = q δ , we define the geometric strategy (with parameters q, δ, α), denoted G = G(q, δ, α), to be the strategy such that G A is the set of all announcements of the form A[f ], where f : Ω → F This strategy generalizes that in [3] where α = δ − 1, although that article also considers the case where Alice holds more than one plane. Let us now show that the strategy is equitable.
Lemma 6. Let q be a prime power, 0 < α < δ and a = q α , and let
We will build a function σ to permute the elements of Ω. We know that |A \ A ′ | = |A ′ \ A|, so we can construct a bijection s :
Using the function s we will define a permutation σ : Ω → Ω given by
Since s is invertible, σ is well defined, and it is easy to check that σ is bijective. We then define Σ :
Then, it is easy to see that Σ has an inverse given by Σ −1 (B) = {σ −1 [H] : H ∈ B}, and hence Σ is a bijection, so that |G A | = |G A ′ | as claimed.
We have now proven that for every hand that Alice can have there is the same number γ of possible announcements. This permits us to set the probability of a particular announcement to be chosen to 1/γ, and thus the geometric strategy is equitative. As mentioned above, this will simplify some computations, even without explicitly computing γ.
In the remainder of this section we will prove that the geometric strategy gives an informative and weakly safe solution to the Russian cards problem, provided c satisfies certain bounds. 
But f is a bijection, so it follows that a + c = |A| + |C| ≥ 2q α − q α−1 , and thus c ≥ q α − q α−1 , contradicting our hypothesis.
We conclude that U = U ′ , so that also A = A ′ and thus the geometric strategy is informative.
Next we must see that, given a card x not held by Cath, there is a nonzero probability that Alice holds x, which means that it is impossible that there is x ∈ Ω \ C such that all α-spaces passing through x meet C. 
Thus if c satisfies this constraint, there is an α-space U touching f (x) but not meeting f [C] and
Likewise, there should be a nonzero probability that any card not held by Cath is held by Bob. In other words, if y is not held by Cath, there should be an α-plane avoiding y and Cath's hand. Proof. Let y ∈ Ω \ C and z ∈ C be arbitrary and V be an α-plane touching both f (y) and f (z). We know that there are q δ−α α-planes parallel or equal to V . Thus if c < q δ−α there is at least one α-plane U parallel to V which does not contain any pont from C. But by construction, y is not on U either. Thus there is an α-plane avoiding both y and U , and we may take
Lemma 10. Let q be a prime power, 0 < α ≤ δ and a, b, c be such that a = q α and a+ b + c = q δ . Then, the geometric strategy with parameters q, δ, α is weakly secure for (a, b, c) whenever c < q δ−α .
Proof. It is straightforward to check that q δ−α < q δ −1 q α −1 , so this is a direct consequence of Lemmas 8 and 9.
Putting together Lemma 7 and Lemma 10 we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Let q be a prime power, 0 < α ≤ δ and a, b, c be such that a = q α and a+ b + c = q δ . Then, the geometric strategy with parameters q, δ, α is weakly safe and informative for (a, b, c) whenever c < min(q α − q α−1 , q δ−α ).
We may use Theorem 2 to find many tuples (a, b, c) for which the geometric strategy is weakly secure. If Alice holds a line in the plane, then we may take c to be almost as large as a: for (a, b, c) .
Proof. Take α = 1, δ = 2 and q an arbitrary prime power and apply Theorem 2.
On the other hand, if c is much smaller, then we can give Alice a higherdimensional plane to ensure that the number of cards is not too large relative to Alice and Cath's hands. Proof. Since ρ is rational, so is 1 + ρ, so we can find 1 ≤ α < δ such that 1 + ρ = δ /α. Since ρ < 1, for large enough q we have that q ρα < q α − q α−1 . Thus for such a q we may use Theorem 2 to see that, for a = q α , c < q δ−α and b = q δ − a − c, the geometric strategy is informative and weakly safe. Moreover, we have that b < q δ = q (1+ρ)α = a (1+ρ) , whereas c < q δ−α = q ρα = α ρ was arbitrary, so all desired conditions are met.
Observe that in either case, the geometric strategy gives infinitely many solutions for tuples (a, b, c) with c < a and b < ac.
Strong safety of the geometric strategy
Since the geometric strategy is equitable, we may apply the results in the previous section to it in order to find parameters for which this strategy is ε-strongly safe. As we have seen, this strategy is weakly safe if c < q α −q α−1 and c < q δ−α . Our goal will be to find tuples for which it is ε-strongly safe for a given ε.
Some auxiliary estimates
We will need to find bounds on the number of hands that Cath considers possible. We begin by counting the total number of hands in an announcement. The following is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.
Lemma 11. The number of a-sets in an announcement A of the geometric strategy with parameters q, δ, α is [q] δ,α q δ−α . Now let us see how many hands Cath can discard from this announcement. Recall that A \ C denotes the set of lines avoiding C and A x \ C denotes the set of lines avoiding C that also pass through x. We may compute the probability that Alice holds x from Cath's perspective as
What we are interested in is bounding the quotient of Cath's perceived probabilites before and after the announcement, that is,
As we will see, by modifying the parameters, this quotient can become arbitrarily close to 1. In order to find bounds for (1), it suffices to bound the numerator, since the denominator is constant. Thus we need to estimate |A x \ C| and |A \ C|. Let us begin with the latter.
Lemma 12.
If A is an announcement of the geometric strategy with parameters α, δ, q and C ⊆ F δ q is non-empty, then
Both equalities hold whenever c = 1.
Proof. We have that |A| = [q] δ,α q δ−α , that is, the number of α-planes in F δ q . Thus it remains to estimate the number of α-planes that meet C to obtain our bounds.
To bound |A \ C| from below, observe that there are [q] δ,α α-planes passing through each point in C and there are c such points, so that there are at most c[q] δ,α α-planes meeting C and thus
Observe that when c > 1 we are subtracting one α-plane at least twice so the inequality is strict, but when c = 1 then equality holds. Now let us show the right-hand inequality. Since C = ∅, we can pick z ∈ C and observe that there are [q] δ,α α-planes meeting z, and thus at least [q] δ,α meeting C. It follows that
and if C = {z} this computation is exact.
Lemma 13. If A is an announcement of the geometric strategy with parameters α, δ, q and C ⊆ F δ q is non-empty, then
Equality holds when c = 1.
Proof. First let us bound |A x \ C| from below. To give our estimate, we will take the number of α-planes passing through x and subtract the number of α-planes passing through x and each y ∈ C, without taking into account that many α-planes will be subtracted twice. Evidently this bound will not be tight, but it will be sufficient to establish our main results.
Recall that [q] δ,α counts all of the α-planes passing through a given point. But, there are [q] δ,α α-planes passing through x and each y ∈ C, and thus there are at most c[q] δ,α planes meeting both x and C. It follows that
Now let us bound |A x \ C| from above. This time we use the fact that there is at least one y 0 ∈ C, and we can discard all of those α-planes that touch y 0 as well as x, of which there are [q] δ,α . It follows that
and the result follows. Once again this bound is exact when c = 1.
Bounding probabilities
The counting lemmas we have given above may be used to bound the probabilities we are interested in. First, we give a more exact bound, and later we will give a simplified version. 
and
Proof. For the lower bound, we put the lower bound of Lemma 13 together with the upper bound of Lemma 12 to obtain
Using Lemma 5.2 and simplifying we obtain
Thus,
using the equalities a = q α and a + b + c = q δ and simplifying once again we obtain Figure 3 : Some tuples with c ∈ {2, 3, 4} for which the geometric strategy is 0.05-strongly safe, as can be verified using the lower and uper bounds from Lemma 14 shown in the last two columns. The last tuple is remarkable in that, while the deck is rather large, in this case the protocol may be considered 'floating-point perfectly' secure. Now we turn to bounding the quotient of probabilities from above. As before, we focus on the numerator, since the denominator is fixed, and use Lemma 13 bound |A x \ C| from above and Lemma 12 to bound |A \ C| from below.
Thus we obtain the following upper bound:
.
Once again we may use Lemma 5.2 and some algebra to obtain
In fact, when q is large, then simpler bounds will suffice for our purposes. 
Proof. Observe that, since δ ≥ 2, it follows that −q δ+α + q α < 0; thus we can remove this term from the denominator in (4), as well as some positive terms from the numerator to obtain
which gives us our lower bound (6) by simplifying. We may also obtain a simpler upper bound by removing negative terms from the numerator and positive terms from the denominator, giving us
which factoring q α and performing polynomial division becomes our simplified upper bound (7).
Convergence
Our simplified bounds from Corollary 3 will be enough to yield many tuples for which the geometric strategy is ε-strongly safe for arbitrarily small ε. It is based on the following.
. Then, if q is a large enough prime power, the geometric strategy with parameters α, δ, q is ε-strongly safe for any c <c(q).
and 1 +c
q 2δ−α −c(q)q δ −q δ−α both converge to 1 as q → ∞. It follows from Corollary 3 that if q is large and c <c(q),
which means that the geometric strategy is ε-strongly safe.
However, convergence may be quicker or slower depending on how we choosē c. For example, if we fix ξ > 0 and takec(q) = ⌊q δ−α−ξ ⌋, then this quotient will tend to one, but if ξ is very small we may need a very large number of cards for it to be less than some given ε. More generally, we have the following:
Then, for q a prime power, any announcement A of the geometric strategy any card x and any set of C cards with at mostc(q) elements,
Proof. If we take c = c(q) ≤ q δ−α−ξ , we have that
The theorem then follows from Corollary 3.
Here we see a trade-off between keeping Cath's hand relatively large and obtaining a good rate of convergence for our bounds. Observe, however, that the larger c is, the less tight our bounds are, so despite our bounds converging rather slowly there may be smaller examples with a large degree of security.
Choosing good parameters
In this section we will focus on strategies for finding specific choices of parameters for which the geometric protocol is ε-safe. In particular, we will fix ε = 0.05, and use our bounds to find several explicit tuples for which the geometric strategy is ε-safe. It is interesting to compare this to [11] , where many choices of parameters for which the protocol is perfectly safe are exhibited. All of the tuples exhibited there have c ≤ 3, and the authors discuss the difficulty of finding perfectly safe strategies for larger c. As we shall see this becomes substantially simpler if we weaken our requirements to (e.g.) 0.05-strong safety. Thus we may argue that passing to a weaker notion of security allows us to make the Russian cards problem substantially easier to solve without compromising security in a practically meaningful way.
Cath has one card
The notion of perfect security for the Russian cards problem was introduced in [12] , where several examples with c = 1 are provided. Here we will show that, in this setting, the bounds we have found may also be used to establish perfect security in the case of the geometric strategy.
Corollary 4. Given 1 ≤ α < δ and a prime power q, the geometric strategy is perfectly safe for (a, b, 1) with a = q α and b = q δ − a − 1.
Proof. We will use our original bounds from Lemma 14. Setting c = 1 in (4) we see that
Similarly, we substitute c = 1 in (5) to obtain
Thus we have seen that
Hence our bounds give an alternative proof that the geometric strategy is perfectly secure when c = 1. Now let us turn our attention to larger c.
Making Cath's hand large
Suppose that we whish to obtain good tuples for which c is as large as possible relative to Alice's hand. Cath's hand is bounded by two expressions on α, one increasing on α (c < q α − q α−1 ) and one decreasing (c = o(q δ−α )). Thus, the maximum value that c may take is when the two bounds coincide, which occurs approximately when δ = 2α or δ = 2α + 1.
The latter case is interesting, since we already have that q α −q α−1 < q δ−α−1 . Thus in cases that Alice holds relatively few cards, less than the square root of the deck, our informativity bound will already give us ε-strong safety for large values of q. To be precise, we have the following: Corollary 5. Let ε, β > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1). Then, there are infinitely many values of a such that for any c < γa there is b < a 2+β so that the geometric strategy is informative and ε-strongly safe for (a, b, c).
Proof. Let ε, β > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1). Pick α large enough so that 1 /α ≤ β and Q large enough so that 1 /Q < (1−γ) /2. Set δ = 2α + 1 andc(q) = q α + q α−1 − 1. Then, since δ − α = α + 1 we have thatc(q) = o(q δ−α ), from which it follows from Theorem 3 that for large q, the geometric strategy is informative and ε-strongly safe for a = q α , c ≤c(q) and b = q δ − a − c. In particular we may also take q > Q, so that c(q) = q α − q α−1 − 1 = (1 − 1 /q − 1 /q α )a > γa.
Meanwhile, b < q δ = (q α ) 2α+1 α < a 2+β , so all desired conditions are met.
Compare the above result to Corollary 1. As before we can have c = O(a), but this time instead of having b < ac we must take b = O(ac 1+β ). Thus the price of obtaining ε-strong security is to make Bob's hand a bit larger than we would need for weak security. In Figure 4 , we fix values of γ and β and use the strategy of Corollary 5 and its proof to find tuples for which the protocol is 0.5-strongly secure.
Making Bob's hand small
We may also give a ε-strongly secure analogue of Corollary 2. Suppose that we instead want to have a small number of cards in Bob's hand relative to Alice's. In our above construction Bob's hand grew relatively quickly, so we want a different strategy for selecting parameters. The trade-off will be that Cath's hand may be substantially smaller than Alice's. In general if we want Bob to have less than a 1+β cards, then Cath must have less than a γ for some γ < β.
Corollary 6. Let ε > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1) and β > γ be such that β ∈ Q. Then, there are infinitely many values of a such that for any c < a γ there is b < a 1+β such that the geometric strategy is informative and ε-strongly safe for (a, b, c).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 2, but taking c < q γα and using Theorem 3.
mation obtained by the eavesdropper may be controlled, to the extent that in some cases we can obtain a degree of safety indistinguishable from perfect safety for all practical purposes. Weakening the notion of perfect security has led to an infinite number of new tuples for which we may still obtain a high degree of security, and indeed the bounds we have given may be used to analyze the level of security in any instance of the geometric strategy. Moreover, our techniques had the added bonus of replicating some results of [12] .
There are further directions that may be explored Although our bounds are tight when c = 1, the larger c is, the less exact they are, which may keep us from identifying many tuples which have a high degree of security. These bounds may be improved with a deeper (and, possibly, messier) combinatorial analysis which takes into account collinear points using the inclusion-exclusion principle. In fact, tailor-made bounds can be used for specific values of c that may be of interest.
Finally, this analysis could be generalized further to include other combinatorial constructions, for example considering a wider class of designs. Such efforts could very well lead to more flexible methods of finding tuples for which there are strategies with very high levels of security.
